

How Human Values and the Rural-Urban Divide Interact to Shape Voting Behaviour

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Introduction

In the past two decades, democratic societies worldwide have been experiencing crises of sizeable magnitudes which reinforced public demands for government actions and interventions, on the one hand, yet gave also way to the formation of populist movements and political parties, on the other, all of which contributed to the legitimization of radical views and assertions in the public realm. These trends have set into motion what some observers identify as democratic backsliding (Bakke & Sitter, 2022; Gidengil et al., 2021; Gillies, 2022; Holesch & Kyriazi, 2022; Jee et al., 2022; McDevitt, 2022; Orhan, 2022; Over, 2021; Shinar, 2021): heightened affective polarization, attempts to undermine the rule of law, interference with the freedom of the media or with the peaceful transfer of power in American democracy, to name just a few illustrative examples.

In light of these multifaceted challenges, understanding citizens' motivations and ideological underpinnings to engage in politics becomes ever more relevant. To be sure, a multitude of conceptual work and empirical studies on the origins of the breadth of political participation has already been advanced and continues to stimulate scientific debate. Notwithstanding, their apparent shortcomings in addressing these newly emerging destabilising trends seem to require a conceptual extension in order to improve their explanatory potential. In this vein, one particularly promising research avenue, that has only recently shifted to the forefront of scholarly attention, adopts Shalom Schwartz' encompassing conceptualisation of Basic Human Values (Davidov et al., 2008; Schwartz, 2006, 1992) resulting in an array of

remarkable empirical findings that complements the existing field of research on personal values and political involvement.

More specifically, basic human values shed light on the individual underpinnings of ideological positioning, party identification, political activism, vote choices, populist voting, or even of running for office and staying successful therein (Davidov et al., 2014; Davidov et al., 2008; Defenderfer, 2019; Dennison et al., 2021; Eisentraut, 2019; Goren et al., 2016; Marcos-Marne, 2021; Ozdemir & Jacob, 2022; Rudnev et al., 2018; Weinberg, 2021).

Although there is a broad consensus that values, just as basic human values, are adopted early in life and relatively stable over the course of life (Doring et al., 2015; Vecchione et al., 2020), this very assumption has increasingly come under empirical scrutiny. As a matter of fact, several studies suggest that personal values¹ can either undergo changes over a human's life cycle (Dobewall et al., 2017; Azimi et al., 2022; Lyons et al., 2005; Lyons et al., 2007) or are impacted by contextual factors, such as a country's economic wealth, inequality or climatic and parasite stress (Betkó et al., 2022; Bonetto et al., 2021; Davidov et al., 2014; Fischer, 2021; O'Dwyer & Coymak, 2020; Piterova & Vyrost, 2019; Rudnev, 2014; Tormos et al., 2017). These findings, which point to the relative malleability of values, in part as a function of contextual exposure, beg the question of whether and how a currently reinvigorating political cleavage, demarcating rural from urban populations (Cramer, 2016; Traunmüller et al., 2021), affects human values and moderates their effects in the political realm.

The aim of this paper is to integrate these two emerging streams of political science research which stand, so far, mostly unconnected. More specifically, we intend to scrutinize the impact of basic human values on party vote choice in European countries with a particular

¹ In the following, personal values and basic human values are used interchangeably.

interest in the *moderating* role of urban vs. rural places of living. We depart from the assumption that both sets of independent variables, i.e. personal values and place of living, contribute independently of each other to the explanation of party vote choice while simultaneously exerting interaction effects on our dependent variable.

Based on round 9 of the European Social Survey (ESS 2018) data, we investigate the role of basic human values in voting for political parties along the ideological spectrum by making use of the Manifesto Project's content analysis of over 1'000 political party programmes (Volkens et al. 2021).

Our comparative analyses with approximately 26'000 full age observations from 28 countries strongly suggest an impact of place on party vote choice, showcasing life in big cities and the countryside exerting opposite effects, and numerous values as strong predictors. The inspection of interaction effects between personal values and place of living provides a fuller picture which underlines the moderating role of the latter for basic human values to affect voting behaviour, yet simultaneously calls for caution not to embrace the assumption of an apparent simplistic rural-urban divide pre-emptively. More specifically, the effects of the four value types benevolence, power, self-direction and security, representing the four higher order values of openness to change, conservation, self-enhancement and self-transcendence, are moderated by individuals' place of living.

Theoretical framework

Empirical studies interested in the underpinnings of political participation more generally and voting behaviour in particular have increasingly been drawing on Shalom Schwartz's (1992) concept of basic human values that have proven to be firmly associated with political values and behaviour (Leimgruber, 2011). While personal values, understood as enduring beliefs or ideals of the desirable (Leimgruber, 2011), and as precursors of political attitudes and action, have a long and firm tradition in political science research (Rokeach, 1973; Inglehart, 1977;


van Deth & Scarbrough, 1998), it is in particular with the advent of Schwartz's motivational circle of ten value types, representing a two-dimensional value space, that this realm of research has been shifting to the forefront in recent years. As numerous cross-cultural investigations have corroborated, these ten value types represent "*universal* requirements of the human condition: security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition and conformity" (Caprara et al., 2017: p. 392, italics by the authors).

As depicted in Figure 1, these ten value types can be assigned to a two-dimensional space where values of *openness to change* (stimulation, self-direction, hedonism) are 'opposed' to values of *conservation* (tradition, security, conformity) and where values of *self-enhancement* (power, achievement) 'collide' with values of *self-transcendence* (universalism, benevolence).²

More specifically, the first dimension reflects a juxtaposition of independent thought and action "versus submissive self-restriction, preservation of traditional practices, and protection" (Schwartz 1996, p. 5, cited in Leimgruber, 2011, p. 109), while the second dimension describes the motivational tensions between the "acceptance of others as equals and concern for their welfare versus pursuit of one's own relative success and dominance over others" (Schwartz 1996, p. 5, cited in Leimgruber, 2011, p. 109). As a matter of fact, adjacent values in this circle reflect similar motivations and are positively related with each other while opposing values indicate conflicting motives and are therefore negatively related (Caprara et al., 2017, p. 392).

² The value of hedonism slightly stands out as empirically it cannot be unequivocally assigned to the higher order value of openness to change (Schwartz et al., 2010).

Figure 1: Schwartz's circular model of values



Source: (Caprara et al., 2017: page 393)

In political terms, these values potentially translate into more specific political orientations and preferences as numerous empirical studies could demonstrate (Aspelund et al., 2013; Caprara et al., 2017; Choi, 2021; Davidov et al., 2020; Dennison et al., 2020; Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2014). In particular, self-transcendence seems to foster leftist political orientations while conservation and self-enhancement are associated with rightist orientations on the ideological continuum. Notwithstanding, the strength of coefficients seem to vary between countries with longer standing democratic traditions and former communist countries where ideological self-placement is apparently less impacted by personal values (Aspelund et al., 2013; Caprara et al., 2017; Piurko et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2014).

In a similar vein, basic human values contribute to the explanation of voting behaviour, too. Irrespective of whether direct or mediated effects are assumed, studies show, for instance, that tradition and conformity ‘discourage’ voting for populist parties while security is positively associated with voting for right-wing populist parties (Marcos-Marne, 2021). By contrast, Ozdemir and Jacob’s study on German voters underlines the importance of *non-conformity* for the vote for the populist far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), while simultaneously corroborating Marcos-Marne’s findings on the effects of security (Ozdemir & Jacob, 2022). Moreover, in a study investigating the interrelatedness between personality traits, human values and voting behaviour, Caprara et. al (2009) disclose the importance of security and universalism for casting one’s vote for political parties of the right and the left side of the political spectrum, respectively, a finding which is also confirmed by Ozdemir and Jacob’s study (2022) based on GLES (German Longitudinal Election Survey) data. Similarly, Schwartz et al.’s (2010) results, based on Italian survey data, disclose effects, albeit indirect, exerted by security, conformity, tradition, power and achievement on voting for centre-right parties and by universalism, benevolence and self-direction on choosing centre-left parties. Despite some data limitations of Leimgruber’s (2011) Swiss study, which only entailed values of conservation and self-transcendence, the central tenants of the aforementioned findings are confirmed. Conservation values are, indirectly, associated with voting for right-wing political parties while values of self-transcendence enhance one’s vote for leftist parties. In sum, we can infer that the higher order values of self-transcendence and conservation are particularly important underpinnings of political orientations and vote choice and yet, as several studies underscore, analysing the effects of each of the ten value types separately remains highly recommendable.

Based on these insights we can proceed and formulate the following hypotheses:

H1: Basis human values are associated with party vote choice.

H2: Conservation (security, tradition, conformity) is positively associated with voting for centre-right or right-wing parties.

H3: Self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence) is positively associated with voting for centre-left or left-wing parties.

Previous studies could not unequivocally point to associations between the higher order values self-enhancement and openness to change. We, therefore, refrain from formulating related hypotheses.

These remarkable findings, which highlight the *political* repercussions of individuals' set of basic values, have been stimulating a wider range of studies into their origins, malleability over time, context sensitivity and intergroup differences. Interestingly, and contrary to the largely held assumption about the stability of values over one's course of life, cross-generational differences as well as value 'adaptations' of immigrants reflecting their experiences of discrimination in their host countries could be detected (Azimi et al., 2022; Czymara & Eisentraut, 2020; Lyons et al., 2007; Tormos et al., 2017). What is more, men and women also appear to differ in the values they hold dear (Lyons et al., 2005).

Longitudinal cross-country analyses further suggest that contextual factors, such as economic inequality or GDP, affect human values, too, although individual changes over the ten-years' period under scrutiny were less apparent (Tormos et al., 2017). As for further individual-level origins, personality traits, also known as the Big 5, appear to lay some foundations for individuals' basic human values' pattern (Caprara et al., 2009). Moreover, as Tormos et al. (2017) demonstrate human values are also associated with people's place of living, or community type. More specifically, living in more rural places is positively related with values of self-transcendence and conservation while living in big cities, but not suburbs, proves to be positively associated with self-enhancement. A stronger prevalence of values of openness to changes, by contrast, can be found in suburbs and big cities alike.

The latter findings, alluding to an interesting interrelationship between the specificities of an individual's place of living and their value pattern, gives rise to considerations which go beyond current research on the political consequences of personal values by combining their explanatory contributions with studies that focus on an apparently (re)emerging trend of a rural-urban political divide (Cramer, 2016; Traunmüller et al., 2021). Or, more specifically, while human values have been proven to exert either direct or indirect effects on political behaviour, whether and to what extent contextual factors *moderate* their impact has not yet been addressed. From this vantage point, we assume that the type of community might not only be a relevant predictor in its own right but also as a moderating force of the impact of human values.

Cramer's (2016) study on rural consciousness and political resentment in Wisconsin, USA, provides a solid conceptual and empirical guidance in this realm of research. Although her analyses are specific to the American political context, as they establish a strong linkage between living in rural places, feeling politically disenchanted and voting for the Republican party, her main arguments and empirical insights also seem to hold for a number of European societies. The Brexit referendum in 2016, for instance, laid bare a noteworthy rural-urban divide with Brexiteers turning their back on urban 'elites'. In Switzerland and France, right-wing populist voters are also more likely to live in the countryside. A similar phenomenon can be observed in Germany, where the AfD is particularly strong in rural regions of Eastern Germany (Traunmüller et al., 2021). Although some of these rurality-resentment-effects on voting patterns can be traced back to compositional effects, i.e. an over- or underrepresentation of groups of individuals whose combined characteristics affect voting behaviour, Traunmüller et al. (2021) demonstrate, by dissecting compositional from other so-called 'different' effects, that lived experiences in places that are perceived to be left behind economically and politically might affect political discontent, too.

Based on these findings, we propose the following hypotheses:

H4: The place of living is associated with party vote choice.

H5: Living in more rural places is associated with voting for more right-leaning political parties.

H6: Living in more urban places is associated with voting for more left-leaning political parties.

As we are particularly interested in the *moderating* role of place of living on human values' political repercussions, we see strong overlaps between rurality and conservation values, both potentially fostering conservative vote choices, and urbanity and self-transcendence fostering left-leaning party choices. As a consequence, we could either assume that

H7a: holding conservation values and living in a more rural place reinforce vote choices for right-leaning political parties.

H8a: holding self-transcendence values and living in a more urban place reinforce vote choices for left-leaning political parties,

or, that the impact of human values is particularly enhanced by places of living that stand in contrast to those values, leading to the formulation of the following hypotheses:

H7b: The effects of conservation values on voting for right-leaning parties are enhanced by living in a more urban place.

H8b: The effects of self-transcendence values on voting for left-leaning parties are enhanced by living in a more rural place.

The subsequent empirical section is dedicated to provide a better and in-depth understanding of the aforementioned breadth of intricacies.

Data, Operationalization and Method

To empirically test the relationships presented above, we employ data from the ninth round of the European Social Survey (ESS 2018). Of this data set, we use about 26'000 full age observations from 28 countries for our models. The respondents were interviewed face-to-face about their social and political attitudes, beliefs and behaviour.

The first of our main independent variables are the basic human values as conceptualized by Schwartz (1992). In the ESS, the Human Values Scale is collected, a 21-item measure of Schwartz's ten human values. The human values are usually used in centred form, so we also employ this type of measurement. This means that from the mean of all items indexing one human value, the mean of all 21 items is subtracted to determine the relative importance of the human value compared to the other values (Schwartz n.d.). This means that we needed all 21 items to calculate each human value. Table A1 in the appendix shows the questions used to measure the human values.

Our second independent variable of interest is the urbanity of the place where the respondent lives. In the ESS, the area where the respondent lives is surveyed with five categories: a big city, the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, a town or a small city, a country village, a farm or home in the countryside. Respondents classify themselves in either of the five categories, so our variable measures subjective and not objective urbanity. We decided to combine the two most rural categories into one, as the number of respondents living on a farm or in a home in the countryside is very small and consequently it does not make sense to keep the category separate. The share of respondents living in each category by country can be found in Figure A1 in the appendix. Our reference category is always the most rural one, i.e. "a country village/a farm or home in the countryside".

Our dependent variable of interest is the left-right positioning of the party elected by the respondent in the last national election. For this purpose, we combine the individual party choice in the last national election with the RILE variable from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2021). The Manifesto Project uses content analysis to derive the policy position of parties from over 50 countries at every election on the basis of their electoral manifesto. An index of 26 positions from the seven domains, external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society as well as social groups, then forms the left-right positioning of the party. Even though the RILE variable has repeatedly been criticised for its validity, reliability, and its low applicability to post-communist countries (Dinas & Gemenis, 2010; Mölder, 2016, 2017), it is nevertheless one of the most widely used and best validated measure of political positions of parties which has many benefits compared to other measures (Budge & McDonald, 2012; Klingemann et al., 2006). In this case, the advantages of the RILE variable are that the party positions are comparable across countries and that we do not measure the political attitude of the respondents on the basis of their self-assessment, but on the basis of their party choice, i.e. their behaviour.

In all our models, we control for respondents' gender, age, education, satisfaction with the household income and political interest. All variables were standardised for the regression analyses. Details on the control variables can be found in Table A2 in the appendix.

As indicated previously, we are dealing with individual-level data that is nested in different countries. To do justice to this clustering, we supplement our linear regression models with country-fixed effects. These fixed effects account for all variance at the macro-level between the different countries. In table 2, we also run interaction models to examine the moderating effect of place of living on the relationship between human values and party choice. Finally,

we weight our data with the weight recommended by the ESS: `anweight`. This weight corrects for different selection probabilities within each country (Kaminska, 2020).

Results

Before we start discussing the results of our regression analyses, we would like to shed some light on the descriptive relation between human values and place of living. Figure A2 in the appendix depicts the mean of all ten human values by place of living. It becomes apparent that the distribution of the human values varies greatly. While the places of living do not differ greatly in their mean values of benevolence, self-direction and universalism, the greatest differences between the places of living are found in their mean values of power and tradition. It is also striking that the distribution of human values across the four places of living categories is often not linear. For achievement and power, for example, the greatest differences are between the big cities and suburbs. This also suggests that the place of living variable should be used categorically rather than continuously. In sum, human values and place of living appear to be associated, raising the question of whether and to what extent they interact in explaining vote choice.

Linear effects of basic human values and place of living on party choice

In this section, we start by focusing on the linear effects the human values and the urbanity of the area where the respondent lives have on party choice, before investigating the interactive effects of place of living and human values in the next section. Table 1 shows the results of eleven linear regression models with country-fixed effects. For reasons of space, only the main effects are shown. The full regression table can be found in Table A3 in the appendix. The reference category for place of living are people living in the countryside.

The first model in Table 1 calculates the effects of place of living as well as our controls without controlling for any human values. The adjusted R^2 is 0.248, which means that the

variables in this model explain about 24.8% of the variance for party choice. The regression analysis shows that residents of big cities, suburbs and towns all elect parties that are significantly further to the left than respondents living in the countryside. The difference between residents of the countryside and residents of big cities is by far the largest and more than twice the size of the difference between residents of the countryside and of towns. This means that there indeed is a relevant rural-urban divide with regard to the placement of the elected party and that the difference is biggest between residents of big cities and of the countryside. Residents of suburbs and of towns are placed between the two poles. These findings are in line with our hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 which assumed an association between place of living and vote choice and that people living in more rural places tend to vote for more right-leaning parties, while people living in more urban places tend to vote for more left-leaning parties. Lastly, when looking at models 2 to 11, we find that the effect of place of living is only slightly diminished by human values and that the effects remain about the same size. In sum, as expected, the political position of ruralites and urbanites differs with regard to their party choice with respondents electing more right-leaning parties the more rural their area of living is.

Models 2 to 11 in Table 1 each look at the effect of one of the human values on party choice. We find that achievement is the only one of the human values with no linear effect on party choice. All other human values significantly contribute to explaining whether someone voted for a more left- or right-leaning party in the last national election. We further find that people valuing benevolence, hedonism, self-direction, stimulation and universalism more highly tend to vote for more left-leaning parties, while respondents valuing conformity, power, security or tradition more highly have a higher probability of voting for a more right-leaning party. These results confirm our hypothesis H1 which suggested an association between basic human values and vote choice. H2 further expected conformity, security and tradition to be

associated with voting for more right-leaning parties which can be confirmed by our findings. Our third hypothesis H3 expected the self-transcendence values benevolence and universalism to be associated with voting for more left-leaning parties. This presumption is also confirmed by our findings in models 2 to 11. However, we also find associations between the openness to change values hedonism, self-direction and stimulation as well as between power and vote choice. The adjusted-R² further shows that conformity, security, tradition and universalism are the human values with the largest explanatory power and consequently also with the largest coefficients. When adding these variables to our regression models, between 25.2% (conformity) and 26.8% (universalism) of the variance for party choice can be explained. In sum, we find that the human values as well as place of living significantly contribute to explaining vote choice. However, in the next section we aim to find out how these variables interact in explaining party choice.

But first, we will briefly look at the effects of the controls. We find that women and the higher educated are significantly more likely to vote for left-leaning parties in almost all of our models. The effect of gender only disappears once we control for universalism, while the effect of education holds true in all models. Conversely, people who are older, more politically interested and more satisfied with their household income are significantly more likely to vote for right-leaning parties. These effects hold true in all our linear regression models.

Interaction effects between human values and place of living

Next, we turn to our interaction models. We interact the human values with the urbanity category in order to evaluate whether the human values have the same effects on party choice for rural as for urban respondents. Due to reasons of space, we do not display the results of these models here. The full regression models can be found in Table A4 in the appendix.

Table 1: Linear effects of basic human values and place of living on party choice

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Big city	-3.749*** (0.437)	-3.750*** (0.437)	-3.769*** (0.436)	-3.650*** (0.435)	-3.719*** (0.437)	-3.848*** (0.436)	-3.696*** (0.428)	-3.719*** (0.435)	-3.693*** (0.434)	-3.514*** (0.435)	-3.802*** (0.436)
Suburbs	-3.302*** (0.487)	-3.303*** (0.487)	-3.307*** (0.487)	-3.252*** (0.487)	-3.299*** (0.487)	-3.344*** (0.485)	-3.391*** (0.484)	-3.287*** (0.487)	-3.329*** (0.487)	-3.133*** (0.484)	-3.151*** (0.476)
Town	-1.644*** (0.336)	-1.645*** (0.336)	-1.656*** (0.335)	-1.605*** (0.334)	-1.624*** (0.335)	-1.659*** (0.335)	-1.747*** (0.333)	-1.640*** (0.335)	-1.669*** (0.335)	-1.525*** (0.334)	-1.569*** (0.331)
Achievement		0.028 (0.158)									
Benevolence			-0.517*** (0.169)								
Conformity				1.131*** (0.156)							
Hedonism					-0.558*** (0.160)						
Power						0.890*** (0.157)					
Security							1.678*** (0.154)				
Self-Direction								-0.517*** (0.159)			
Stimulation									-0.803*** (0.154)		
Tradition										1.350*** (0.158)	
Universalism											-2.543*** (0.155)
<i>N</i>	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.248	0.248	0.249	0.252	0.249	0.250	0.256	0.249	0.250	0.253	0.268


Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.050$, *** $p < 0.01$. The reference category for urbanity is “country village / a farm or home in the countryside”. The left right positioning of the elected party is operationalised in such a way that a negative value means a left political attitude and a positive value means a right political attitude.

Source: ESS 2018, own calculations.

First, we find no significant interaction terms for achievement, conformity, hedonism, stimulation, tradition and universalism. All these human values seem to have the same effect on vote choice for people living in the countryside or more urban places. However, we do find significant interaction terms for benevolence, power, security and self-direction. Interestingly enough, the four human values with significant interaction terms do not stem from the same higher-order value, but cover all four higher-order values of *openness to change*, *self-enhancement*, *conservation* and *self-transcendence*. Thus, it cannot be said that heterogeneous effects of human values on vote choice along the rural-urban continuum apply only to values from one higher-order value. Instead, the nonlinear effects appear to be a cross-group phenomenon. To illustrate the significant interaction terms we found, we depict linear predictions of vote choice for the four categories of place of living along different levels of basic human values in Figures 2 to 5. We will briefly discuss the significant interaction effects with the help of these graphical representations.

Regarding benevolence in Figure 2, we find that the effect of voting for a more left-leaning party when valuing benevolence higher is much stronger in big cities than in the countryside. Interestingly, for people living in the countryside, benevolence does not have a statistically significant nor relevant effect on party choice whatsoever. For people living in big cities, however, we find that those who value benevolence more highly also tend to vote for left-leaning parties. Lastly, the effect does not differ significantly between residents of the countryside and the suburbs or residents of the countryside and towns. Thus, the rural-urban divide regarding vote choice is weaker for people who do not value benevolence highly and becomes larger, the more important this personal value is. This contradicts our hypothesis H8b and is in line with our hypothesis H8a that expected self-transcendence values, of which benevolence is one, to have a stronger effect on vote choice in more urban places than in more rural ones, suggesting a cumulative effect when place of living and basic human values are in line. Thus, the relative importance of benevolence does not simply have a homogeneous effect on party choice, but rather depends on where someone lives.


Figure 2: Linear prediction of left-right placement of elected party by place of living category among different values of benevolence



Source: ESS 2018, own calculations and depiction.

Figure 3 depicts the linear prediction of vote choice along different values of power. We find that the effect of electing more right-leaning parties when valuing power more highly is stronger in the big cities and in the suburbs than it is in the countryside. In Figure 2, this is depicted by a steeper prediction line for these two urbanity categories. However, there is no statistically significant difference between the effect in towns and in the countryside. Regarding the rural-urban divide of party choice, this means that the divide is larger for people who do not value power highly, while it becomes much smaller once power becomes a more important human value for respondents. We did not formulate any hypothesis regarding power, as values of self-enhancement were not unequivocally associated with vote choice in prior studies. Nevertheless, as for benevolence, we find that power does not have a homogeneous effect on vote choice either, but that the strength of the effect rather depends on the urbanity of the context where someone lives.


Figure 3: Linear prediction of left-right placement of elected party by place of living category among different values of power



Source: ESS 2018, own calculations and depiction.

Third, regarding security, we find that the effect of voting for a more right-leaning party when valuing security higher is even stronger in big cities than it is in the countryside, as can be seen in Figure 4. The linear predictions show an especially strong effect of security in big cities, while the effect is somewhat weaker in the other three categories. Table A4 in the appendix shows that the interaction term is not statistically significant for suburbs and towns. This means that the rural-urban divide of party choice between the countryside and big cities tends to diminish when security becomes a more important value. However, the divide between suburbs or towns and the countryside does not diminish. This contradicts our hypothesis H7a and is in line with our hypothesis H7b that expected a stronger effect of conservation values on vote choice in more urban places than in more rural ones, suggesting a stronger relation between basic human values and vote choice when the place of living stands in contrast to those values. Once again, our analysis shows that the urbanity of the context is important for the effect a human value, in this case security, has on vote choice.

Figure 4: Linear prediction of left-right placement of elected party by place of living category among different values of security




Source: ESS 2018, own calculations and depiction.

Lastly, the linear predictions along self-direction are depicted in Figure 5. We find statistically significant differences between the effect in the countryside and in big cities as well as in the countryside and in towns. In both cases, people living in these categories experience a negative effect from self-direction, meaning that people who value self-direction more highly tend to vote for more left-leaning parties. Self-direction does not have a statistically significant effect on vote choice in the countryside, however. The effect does not statistically significantly differ between residents of the countryside and the suburbs. Regarding the rural-urban divide of party choice, this means that the divide gets bigger when self-direction becomes a more important value. On the other hand, the difference in the linear prediction of vote choice between the countryside and big cities or towns is very small when self-direction is not valued highly. As for power, we had not formulated any hypotheses for self-direction, since we did not expect openness to change values to be unequivocally related to vote choice based on

prior studies. Once again, we conclude that the human value self-direction does not have a homogeneous influence on vote choice, but that the effect strongly depends on the place where a respondent lives.

Figure 5: Linear prediction of left-right placement of elected party by place of living category among different values of self-direction



Source: ESS 2018, own calculations and depiction.

In sum, we first found that residents of the countryside vote significantly more for right-leaning parties than residents of other urbanity categories and that there indeed is a rural-urban divide in vote choice. Second, the linear regression models revealed that people who value benevolence, hedonism, self-direction, stimulation and universalism more highly tend to vote for more left-leaning parties, while people valuing conformity, power, security or tradition have a tendency of preferring right-leaning parties. Achievement is the only basic human value with no statistically significant effect on party choice. Third, our interaction models have shown that the effects of the human values are not homogeneous between residents of our four urbanity categories: The negative effect of benevolence only exists for residents of big cities, but not for residents of the countryside. For power, we find that its positive effect is larger in big cities than in the countryside. Regarding security, our models reveal a

stronger positive effect in big cities than in the countryside. Lastly, we find that self-direction only exhibits its negative effect for residents of big cities and towns, while suburbanites do not significantly differ from rural residents who do not experience any effect of self-direction on their vote choice. In short, the effect of human values on vote choice depends strongly on where a person lives.

In Conclusion

This study departed from the assumption that political phenomena, that currently seem to destabilise democratic societies, could be better assessed if well established explanatory concepts were extended by Shalom Schwartz's concept of basic human values. In political science, this universally valid social psychological concept has increasingly gained prominence as it has proven to lay the individual foundations for ideological orientations, political attitudes and behaviour. In line with these previous findings, our analyses, based on most recent European survey data, exhibit unequivocally the direct effects on voting of nearly all of the ten different value types, which make up for four distinctive higher order values, although their effect sizes differ in degree. These interesting and corroborating findings, notwithstanding, we believe that this paper's innovative contribution refers to its insights into the *moderating* role of contextual factors, or more precisely, of individuals' place of living. As a consequence, this research focus does not only allow us to test for the pertinence and effects of rural resentments, representing a newly emerging rural-urban divide, but also to scrutinize whether and how these contexts, with their inferred characteristics, either reinforce or weaken human values' relationships with vote choice.

On a more general level, our results are in line with previous findings as they suggest that people who live in more rural places tend to vote more right-leaning parties than individuals who live in big cities. To be sure, this rather undifferentiated interpretation does not take country-specific circumstances into account, yet simultaneously underscores that a crude rural/urban dichotomy would overlook important cross-community-type effects.

With regard to the moderating role of our rural/urban categorical variable we do not only find that it matters and that its effects are not linear, i.e. *not* systematically running from smaller to bigger or vice versa, but also that all four higher order values are affected. Concomitantly, though, our findings suggest


that for similar empirical analyses it would *not* be recommendable to combine Schwartz's ten single value types into higher order values as some adjacent values showed unexpected divergent effects.

As for the question if community-type contexts give rise to cumulative or weakening or 'opposing' effects of basic human values the answer must still remain vague. As a matter of fact, our findings suggest that all of these three scenarios are plausible which begs the question if some value types are more easily 'triggered' by residential contexts that appear, *prima facie*, less conducive to them while others' influential potential thrives in a more 'value-convergent' context.

To put all these insights into perspective, though, we should note that our predictors' main and combined contributions to the explained variances of our dependent variable are rather modest. Yet, the RILE variable, operationalised and provided by the Manifesto project, proved to be a viable and useful indicator for our research purpose. Notwithstanding, the usage of this indicator automatically *precluded* all non-voters, irrespective of their reasons for abstaining from vote. Drawing on the breadth of findings presented above, we believe that it is safe to assume that basic human values and place of living as a moderator might, in part, elucidate their motivations, too. Future research on this topic could address its current shortcomings. The ESS data, which has been collecting the Schwartz's basic values since its first launch, certainly invites to investigate in more detail the interactions with selected country-level indicators as well as the effects of their changes over time. Finally, and in light of the broad range of available attitudinal and behavioural ESS data, future studies could aim at exploring these pathways further.


Appendix

Figure A1: Share of respondents per place of living category and country



Source: ESS 2018, own depiction.

Figure A2: Mean centered basic human values by place of living



Source: ESS 2018, own depiction.

Table A1: Measurement of the basic human values

Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. (Answer scale: 1 = not like me at all, 6 = very much like me)	
Achievement	It's important to him/her to show his/her abilities. He/she wants people to admire what he/she does. Being very successful is important to him/her. He/she hopes people will recognise his/her achievements.
Benevolence	It's very important to him/her to help the people around him/her. He/she wants to care for their well-being. It is important to him/her to be loyal to his/her friends. He/she wants to devote himself/herself to people close to him/her.
Conformity	He/she believes that people should do what they're told. He/she thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. It is important to him/her always to behave properly. He/she wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.
Hedonism	Having a good time is important to him/her. He/she likes to "spoil" himself/herself. He/she seeks every chance he/she can to have fun. It is important to him/her to do things that give him/her pleasure.

Power	It is important to him/her to be rich. He/she wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.
	It is important to him/her to get respect from others. He/she wants people to do what he/she says.
Security	It is important to him/her to live in secure surroundings. He/she avoids anything that might endanger his/her safety.
	It is important to him/her that the government ensures his/her safety against all threats. He/she wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
Self-direction	Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him/her. He/she likes to do things in his/her own original way.
	It is important to him/her to make his/her own decisions about what he/she does. He/she likes to be free and not depend on others.
Stimulation	He/she likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He/she thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.
	He/she looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He/she wants to have an exciting life.
Tradition	It is important to him/her to be humble and modest. He/she tries not to draw attention to himself/herself.
	Tradition is important to him/her. He/she tries to follow the customs handed down by his/her religion or his/her family.
Universalism	He/she thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He/she believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.
	It is important to him/her to listen to people who are different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them.
	He/she strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him/her.

Source: ESS 2018.

Table A2: Measurement of independent variables

Variable	Question	Original answer scale
Gender	Sex of the respondent	Male (0) Female (1)
Age	Age of the respondent	Age in years (between 18 and 114)
Education	About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time? Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling.	Years of education (between 0 and 20)
Income	Which of the description on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?	Living comfortably on present income (4) Coping on present income (3) Finding it difficult on present income (2) Finding it very difficult on present income (1)

Political interest	How interested would you say you are in politics – are you...	... very interested, (4) ... quite interested, (3) ... hardly interested, (2) ... or, not at all interested? (1)
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Source: ESS 2018.

Table A3: Full linear models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Big city		-3.749*** (0.437)	-3.750*** (0.437)	-3.769*** (0.436)	-3.650*** (0.435)	-3.719*** (0.437)	-3.848*** (0.436)	-3.719*** (0.435)	-3.696*** (0.428)	-3.693*** (0.434)	-3.514*** (0.435)	-3.802*** (0.436)
Suburbs		-3.302*** (0.487)	-3.303*** (0.487)	-3.307*** (0.487)	-3.252*** (0.487)	-3.299*** (0.487)	-3.344*** (0.485)	-3.287*** (0.487)	-3.391*** (0.484)	-3.329*** (0.487)	-3.133*** (0.484)	-3.151*** (0.476)
Town		-1.644*** (0.336)	-1.645*** (0.336)	-1.656*** (0.335)	-1.605*** (0.334)	-1.624*** (0.335)	-1.659*** (0.335)	-1.640*** (0.335)	-1.747*** (0.333)	-1.669*** (0.335)	-1.525*** (0.334)	-1.569*** (0.331)
Achievement			0.028 (0.158)									
Benevolence				-0.517*** (0.169)								
Conformity					1.131*** (0.156)							
Hedonism						-0.558*** (0.160)						
Power							0.890*** (0.157)					
Security								-0.517*** (0.159)				
Self- Direction									1.678*** (0.154)			
Stimulation										-0.803*** (0.154)		
Tradition											1.350*** (0.158)	
Universalism												-2.543*** (0.155)
Female	-0.887***	-0.896***	-0.890***	-0.745**	-0.809***	-0.956***	-0.707**	-0.896***	-1.165***	-0.995***	-1.030***	-0.252

	(0.288)	(0.287)	(0.288)	(0.290)	(0.286)	(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.286)	(0.284)	(0.286)	(0.285)	(0.285)
Age	0.936*** (0.163)	0.926*** (0.160)	0.931*** (0.162)	0.946*** (0.160)	0.679*** (0.164)	0.810*** (0.165)	0.972*** (0.160)	0.926*** (0.160)	0.685*** (0.160)	0.751*** (0.163)	0.630*** (0.164)	1.086*** (0.159)
Political interest	0.677*** (0.168)	0.596*** (0.167)	0.596*** (0.167)	0.573*** (0.167)	0.494*** (0.167)	0.602*** (0.167)	0.561*** (0.168)	0.548*** (0.167)	0.497*** (0.166)	0.556*** (0.167)	0.487*** (0.166)	0.330** (0.167)
Education	-0.884*** (0.162)	-0.670*** (0.163)	-0.671*** (0.163)	-0.663*** (0.163)	-0.592*** (0.163)	-0.684*** (0.163)	-0.640*** (0.163)	-0.604*** (0.163)	-0.479*** (0.162)	-0.623*** (0.163)	-0.542*** (0.163)	-0.376** (0.164)
Satisfaction with income	0.847*** (0.176)	0.825*** (0.175)	0.824*** (0.175)	0.813*** (0.176)	0.804*** (0.175)	0.856*** (0.175)	0.799*** (0.176)	0.824*** (0.175)	0.867*** (0.174)	0.821*** (0.175)	0.894*** (0.174)	0.735*** (0.176)
Belgium	2.554*** (0.654)	2.068*** (0.650)	2.073*** (0.650)	2.124*** (0.648)	1.973*** (0.648)	2.165*** (0.651)	2.366*** (0.652)	2.026*** (0.649)	2.885*** (0.648)	2.332*** (0.653)	1.717*** (0.647)	2.230*** (0.635)
Bulgaria	13.056*** (0.603)	13.333*** (0.613)	13.318*** (0.619)	13.201*** (0.614)	12.964*** (0.616)	13.064*** (0.618)	13.216*** (0.617)	12.954*** (0.625)	13.168*** (0.608)	13.511*** (0.614)	12.744*** (0.616)	12.273*** (0.626)
Switzerland	-0.105 (1.348)	-0.605 (1.340)	-0.595 (1.341)	-0.500 (1.339)	-0.170 (1.337)	-0.481 (1.341)	-0.408 (1.340)	-0.420 (1.342)	0.158 (1.334)	-0.361 (1.339)	-0.811 (1.335)	-0.057 (1.313)
Cyprus	7.994*** (1.557)	8.441*** (1.582)	8.453*** (1.583)	8.579*** (1.571)	8.631*** (1.591)	8.233*** (1.585)	8.875*** (1.578)	8.452*** (1.577)	7.909*** (1.566)	8.391*** (1.574)	7.540*** (1.570)	9.303*** (1.587)
Czech Republic	-13.323*** (0.647)	-12.925*** (0.649)	-12.918*** (0.650)	-13.200*** (0.654)	-13.127*** (0.648)	-12.993*** (0.650)	-13.278*** (0.652)	-12.942*** (0.650)	-13.246*** (0.649)	-12.616*** (0.653)	-13.040*** (0.647)	-14.030*** (0.646)
Germany	-4.481*** (0.661)	-4.499*** (0.657)	-4.488*** (0.660)	-4.301*** (0.660)	-4.249*** (0.654)	-4.443*** (0.656)	-4.099*** (0.662)	-4.412*** (0.657)	-4.335*** (0.648)	-4.449*** (0.656)	-4.885*** (0.649)	-3.796*** (0.650)
Denmark	7.057*** (1.056)	7.350*** (1.049)	7.363*** (1.051)	7.544*** (1.049)	7.021*** (1.043)	7.510*** (1.048)	7.684*** (1.049)	7.340*** (1.047)	8.102*** (1.052)	7.601*** (1.048)	7.202*** (1.041)	7.331*** (1.035)
Estonia	-0.727 (0.619)	-0.332 (0.613)	-0.322 (0.616)	-0.330 (0.612)	-0.506 (0.611)	-0.410 (0.614)	-0.059 (0.616)	-0.342 (0.613)	-0.377 (0.610)	-0.070 (0.615)	-0.586 (0.610)	-0.133 (0.608)
Spain	-16.626*** (0.655)	-16.646*** (0.650)	-16.627*** (0.658)	-16.504*** (0.650)	-16.719*** (0.646)	-16.731*** (0.651)	-16.103*** (0.658)	-16.613*** (0.648)	-16.716*** (0.647)	-16.504*** (0.649)	-17.274*** (0.648)	-15.651*** (0.646)
Finland	-13.171*** (0.630)	-12.927*** (0.620)	-12.906*** (0.632)	-12.739*** (0.621)	-13.095*** (0.616)	-12.779*** (0.620)	-12.251*** (0.630)	-12.929*** (0.619)	-12.628*** (0.617)	-12.560*** (0.624)	-12.968*** (0.614)	-11.811*** (0.611)

France	-1.951** (0.772)	-1.992*** (0.766)	-1.972** (0.776)	-1.854** (0.763)	-1.803** (0.759)	-1.755** (0.765)	-1.420* (0.771)	-1.990*** (0.765)	-1.567** (0.756)	-1.775** (0.765)	-2.412*** (0.762)	-0.684 (0.762)
Great Britain	-10.746*** (0.620)	-10.606*** (0.618)	-10.599*** (0.619)	-10.472*** (0.618)	-10.601*** (0.614)	-10.763*** (0.619)	-10.217*** (0.622)	-10.621*** (0.617)	-10.502*** (0.611)	-10.290*** (0.621)	-10.953*** (0.614)	-10.130*** (0.610)
Croatia	-1.818*** (0.550)	-1.568*** (0.547)	-1.567*** (0.547)	-1.525*** (0.545)	-1.766*** (0.544)	-1.690*** (0.548)	-1.366** (0.549)	-1.651*** (0.546)	-1.662*** (0.544)	-1.732*** (0.548)	-1.953*** (0.543)	-0.879 (0.543)
Hungary	25.682*** (1.347)	26.067*** (1.339)	26.063*** (1.339)	25.838*** (1.342)	26.209*** (1.339)	26.190*** (1.341)	25.875*** (1.340)	26.046*** (1.338)	26.059*** (1.334)	26.278*** (1.339)	25.981*** (1.340)	25.036*** (1.339)
Ireland	-10.993*** (0.668)	-11.092*** (0.669)	-11.084*** (0.671)	-11.026*** (0.668)	-11.149*** (0.670)	-11.291*** (0.671)	-10.816*** (0.671)	-11.147*** (0.669)	-11.156*** (0.666)	-10.852*** (0.672)	-11.722*** (0.671)	-10.814*** (0.665)
Iceland	-19.165*** (0.934)	-18.896*** (0.944)	-18.872*** (0.954)	-18.587*** (0.946)	-18.690*** (0.946)	-18.764*** (0.945)	-18.405*** (0.948)	-18.902*** (0.945)	-18.297*** (0.945)	-18.505*** (0.950)	-19.203*** (0.944)	-17.715*** (0.938)
Italy	1.242** (0.544)	1.055** (0.538)	1.046* (0.541)	0.858 (0.540)	0.783 (0.536)	0.665 (0.548)	0.876 (0.539)	0.940* (0.538)	0.932* (0.533)	1.149** (0.538)	0.522 (0.538)	0.646 (0.531)
Latvia	10.189*** (1.228)	10.157*** (1.229)	10.166*** (1.230)	10.070*** (1.233)	10.371*** (1.230)	10.155*** (1.229)	10.325*** (1.234)	10.156*** (1.232)	9.931*** (1.244)	10.550*** (1.233)	9.745*** (1.232)	9.849*** (1.247)
Montenegro	0.962* (0.532)	1.297** (0.532)	1.295** (0.533)	1.245** (0.532)	0.895* (0.534)	1.009* (0.538)	1.409*** (0.535)	1.231** (0.533)	1.331** (0.533)	1.514*** (0.534)	0.937* (0.533)	0.949* (0.539)
Netherlands	3.894*** (0.645)	3.639*** (0.639)	3.646*** (0.640)	3.697*** (0.637)	3.713*** (0.634)	3.760*** (0.639)	3.950*** (0.640)	3.716*** (0.638)	4.439*** (0.640)	3.974*** (0.642)	3.506*** (0.634)	3.944*** (0.627)
Norway	-11.093*** (0.672)	-11.116*** (0.667)	-11.104*** (0.671)	-10.935*** (0.669)	-11.735*** (0.671)	-11.209*** (0.667)	-10.848*** (0.668)	-11.107*** (0.667)	-10.506*** (0.666)	-10.845*** (0.670)	-11.043*** (0.665)	-10.803*** (0.656)
Poland	5.295*** (0.641)	5.146*** (0.633)	5.148*** (0.633)	5.001*** (0.634)	4.641*** (0.632)	4.625*** (0.651)	4.889*** (0.636)	5.005*** (0.633)	4.776*** (0.629)	5.234*** (0.631)	4.590*** (0.630)	5.149*** (0.628)
Portugal	-0.951 (0.663)	-0.559 (0.656)	-0.563 (0.657)	-0.499 (0.653)	-0.118 (0.654)	-0.441 (0.655)	-0.039 (0.661)	-0.451 (0.656)	-0.073 (0.654)	-0.359 (0.656)	-0.838 (0.652)	-0.219 (0.646)
Serbia	-22.741*** (0.986)	-22.470*** (0.996)	-22.473*** (0.996)	-22.421*** (0.994)	-22.760*** (0.999)	-22.830*** (1.003)	-22.168*** (0.998)	-22.632*** (0.998)	-22.872*** (0.996)	-22.443*** (0.999)	-23.043*** (1.001)	-22.163*** (0.994)

Sweden	-5.318*** (0.732)	-4.865*** (0.731)	-4.847*** (0.739)	-4.673*** (0.732)	-4.800*** (0.728)	-4.744*** (0.731)	-4.539*** (0.732)	-4.780*** (0.731)	-3.913*** (0.742)	-4.607*** (0.735)	-5.104*** (0.726)	-3.749*** (0.721)
Slovenia	2.936*** (0.862)	2.781*** (0.851)	2.776*** (0.852)	2.579*** (0.853)	2.750*** (0.847)	2.743*** (0.850)	3.167*** (0.855)	2.739*** (0.849)	2.826*** (0.850)	2.952*** (0.853)	2.200*** (0.849)	2.778*** (0.850)
Slovakia	7.996*** (0.856)	7.998*** (0.861)	7.997*** (0.861)	7.677*** (0.864)	7.810*** (0.866)	7.838*** (0.863)	7.730*** (0.857)	7.967*** (0.865)	7.721*** (0.867)	8.245*** (0.866)	7.782*** (0.878)	7.273*** (0.866)
Constant	-4.206*** (0.519)	-2.678*** (0.534)	-2.686*** (0.535)	-2.741*** (0.533)	-2.696*** (0.530)	-2.584*** (0.533)	-2.913*** (0.537)	-2.660*** (0.533)	-2.627*** (0.528)	-2.846*** (0.535)	-2.388*** (0.530)	-3.169*** (0.527)
<i>N</i>	25774	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.241	0.248	0.248	0.249	0.252	0.249	0.250	0.249	0.256	0.250	0.253	0.268

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.050$, *** $p < 0.01$. The reference category for place of living is “country village / a farm or home in the countryside”. The reference category for the countries is Austria. All basic human values, age, political interest, education, satisfaction with income are standardized. The left right positioning of the elected party is operationalised in such a way that a negative value means a left political attitude and a positive value means a right political attitude.

Source: ESS 2018, own calculations.

Table A4: Interaction models between basic human values and place of living

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Big city	-3.714*** (0.436)	-3.652*** (0.434)	-3.599*** (0.438)	-3.717*** (0.438)	-3.797*** (0.436)	-3.719*** (0.435)	-3.533*** (0.442)	-3.674*** (0.435)	-3.548*** (0.445)	-3.781*** (0.443)
Suburbs	-3.307*** (0.485)	-3.271*** (0.489)	-3.313*** (0.485)	-3.301*** (0.483)	-3.142*** (0.488)	-3.287*** (0.487)	-3.242*** (0.492)	-3.327*** (0.487)	-3.122*** (0.487)	-3.033*** (0.494)
Town	-1.597*** (0.334)	-1.606*** (0.333)	-1.612*** (0.333)	-1.626*** (0.335)	-1.601*** (0.331)	-1.640*** (0.335)	-1.590*** (0.335)	-1.684*** (0.336)	-1.552*** (0.335)	-1.613*** (0.331)
Achievement	-0.253 (0.233)									
Achievement #Big city	0.714 (0.437)									
Achievement #Suburbs	0.010 (0.456)									
Achievement #Town	0.478 (0.337)									
Benevolence		-0.125 (0.261)								
Benevolence #Big city		-1.325*** (0.452)								
Benevolence #Suburbs		-0.336 (0.494)								
Benevolence #Town		-0.385 (0.368)								
Conformity			1.158*** (0.236)							
Conformity #Big city			0.307 (0.417)							
Conformity			-0.365							

#Suburbs	(0.481)		
Conformity #Town	-0.093 (0.340)		
Hedonism	-0.468** (0.236)		
Hedonism #Big city	-0.167 (0.419)		
Hedonism #Suburbs	-0.108 (0.505)		
Hedonism #Town	-0.154 (0.329)		
Power		0.433* (0.235)	
Power #Big city		0.960** (0.431)	
Power #Suburbs		1.116** (0.501)	
Power #Town		0.454 (0.332)	
Security			1.540*** (0.230)
Security #Big city			0.995** (0.421)
Security #Suburbs			-0.238 (0.476)
Security #Town			-0.042 (0.338)
Self-direction			0.161 (0.232)

Self-direction #Big city	-1.685*** (0.474)		
Self-direction #Suburbs	-0.721 (0.507)		
Self-direction #Town	-0.880*** (0.339)		
Stimulation		-0.684*** (0.235)	
Stimulation #Big city		-0.486 (0.438)	
Stimulation #Suburbs		0.252 (0.484)	
Stimulation #Town		-0.220 (0.346)	
Tradition			1.112*** (0.239)
Tradition #Big city			0.199 (0.450)
Tradition #Suburbs			0.568 (0.486)
Tradition #Town			0.382 (0.340)
Universalism			-2.526*** (0.234)
Universalism #Big city			-0.213 (0.454)
Universalism #Suburbs			-0.418 (0.473)

Universalism #Town										0.225 (0.337)
Female	-0.893*** (0.288)	-0.745** (0.290)	-0.810*** (0.286)	-0.953*** (0.286)	-0.701** (0.288)	-0.865*** (0.286)	-1.153*** (0.284)	-0.993*** (0.286)	-1.024*** (0.285)	-0.253 (0.285)
Age	0.931*** (0.162)	0.945*** (0.160)	0.677*** (0.165)	0.806*** (0.165)	0.972*** (0.160)	0.924*** (0.160)	0.676*** (0.160)	0.746*** (0.163)	0.629*** (0.164)	1.082*** (0.159)
Political interest	0.596*** (0.167)	0.567*** (0.167)	0.491*** (0.167)	0.600*** (0.167)	0.552*** (0.168)	0.547*** (0.166)	0.500*** (0.166)	0.555*** (0.167)	0.485*** (0.166)	0.326* (0.168)
Education	-0.669*** (0.164)	-0.655*** (0.163)	-0.594*** (0.163)	-0.685*** (0.163)	-0.633*** (0.163)	-0.613*** (0.163)	-0.481*** (0.162)	-0.629*** (0.163)	-0.545*** (0.163)	-0.372** (0.163)
Satisfaction with income	0.821*** (0.175)	0.803*** (0.176)	0.807*** (0.175)	0.857*** (0.175)	0.794*** (0.176)	0.825*** (0.175)	0.875*** (0.174)	0.824*** (0.175)	0.890*** (0.174)	0.735*** (0.176)
Belgium	2.099*** (0.650)	2.098*** (0.646)	1.972*** (0.647)	2.162*** (0.651)	2.371*** (0.653)	2.010*** (0.650)	2.829*** (0.649)	2.340*** (0.653)	1.715*** (0.647)	2.211*** (0.635)
Bulgaria	13.253*** (0.618)	13.123*** (0.613)	12.927*** (0.617)	13.076*** (0.619)	13.268*** (0.616)	12.836*** (0.631)	13.024*** (0.613)	13.517*** (0.614)	12.773*** (0.620)	12.251*** (0.633)
Switzerland	-0.601 (1.340)	-0.513 (1.337)	-0.178 (1.337)	-0.486 (1.341)	-0.393 (1.340)	-0.573 (1.342)	0.114 (1.334)	-0.356 (1.339)	-0.807 (1.335)	-0.076 (1.314)
Cyprus	8.413*** (1.586)	8.558*** (1.577)	8.567*** (1.590)	8.234*** (1.585)	8.868*** (1.577)	8.357*** (1.576)	7.882*** (1.566)	8.378*** (1.572)	7.531*** (1.570)	9.297*** (1.585)
Czech Republic	-12.918*** (0.650)	-13.341*** (0.654)	-13.154*** (0.649)	-12.989*** (0.650)	-13.307*** (0.653)	-13.018*** (0.651)	-13.356*** (0.652)	-12.593*** (0.654)	-13.048*** (0.647)	-14.060*** (0.653)
Germany	-4.476*** (0.660)	-4.332*** (0.659)	-4.265*** (0.653)	-4.438*** (0.656)	-4.122*** (0.661)	-4.508*** (0.654)	-4.366*** (0.647)	-4.440*** (0.656)	-4.881*** (0.648)	-3.819*** (0.650)
Denmark	7.360*** (1.052)	7.543*** (1.047)	7.008*** (1.043)	7.520*** (1.049)	7.636*** (1.049)	7.206*** (1.048)	8.070*** (1.052)	7.595*** (1.048)	7.212*** (1.041)	7.299*** (1.035)
Estonia	-0.300 (0.616)	-0.372 (0.611)	-0.520 (0.611)	-0.408 (0.614)	-0.061 (0.616)	-0.432 (0.615)	-0.463 (0.613)	-0.070 (0.616)	-0.587 (0.611)	-0.173 (0.609)
Spain	-16.609*** (0.616)	-16.547*** (0.611)	-16.729*** (0.611)	-16.723*** (0.614)	-16.098*** (0.616)	-16.657*** (0.615)	-16.750*** (0.613)	-16.501*** (0.616)	-17.261*** (0.611)	-15.688*** (0.609)

	(0.657)	(0.647)	(0.646)	(0.651)	(0.658)	(0.649)	(0.648)	(0.649)	(0.650)	(0.646)
Finland	-12.896*** (0.633)	-12.728*** (0.619)	-13.088*** (0.616)	-12.769*** (0.621)	-12.234*** (0.630)	-12.974*** (0.620)	-12.660*** (0.617)	-12.538*** (0.625)	-12.950*** (0.614)	-11.819*** (0.611)
France	-1.954** (0.776)	-1.885** (0.761)	-1.800** (0.759)	-1.754** (0.765)	-1.443* (0.771)	-2.010*** (0.768)	-1.590** (0.757)	-1.763** (0.765)	-2.405*** (0.763)	-0.703 (0.762)
Great Britain	-10.604*** (0.619)	-10.523*** (0.617)	-10.596*** (0.614)	-10.758*** (0.619)	-10.248*** (0.621)	-10.690*** (0.617)	-10.506*** (0.612)	-10.281*** (0.621)	-10.943*** (0.614)	-10.171*** (0.609)
Croatia	-1.566*** (0.547)	-1.461*** (0.543)	-1.786*** (0.544)	-1.688*** (0.548)	-1.326** (0.549)	-1.657*** (0.546)	-1.782*** (0.547)	-1.781*** (0.550)	-1.949*** (0.544)	-0.898* (0.543)
Hungary	26.057*** (1.339)	25.771*** (1.340)	26.228*** (1.340)	26.203*** (1.341)	25.872*** (1.341)	25.977*** (1.341)	25.969*** (1.335)	26.264*** (1.339)	25.978*** (1.341)	25.017*** (1.340)
Ireland	-11.075*** (0.670)	-11.086*** (0.667)	-11.150*** (0.669)	-11.277*** (0.672)	-10.845*** (0.671)	-11.219*** (0.670)	-11.187*** (0.666)	-10.850*** (0.671)	-11.710*** (0.671)	-10.858*** (0.665)
Iceland	-18.892*** (0.954)	-18.625*** (0.947)	-18.697*** (0.946)	-18.750*** (0.946)	-18.379*** (0.950)	-18.981*** (0.947)	-18.381*** (0.945)	-18.505*** (0.950)	-19.190*** (0.945)	-17.750*** (0.938)
Italy	1.062** (0.541)	0.864 (0.538)	0.774 (0.536)	0.669 (0.548)	0.925* (0.539)	0.930* (0.539)	0.890* (0.534)	1.138** (0.539)	0.529 (0.540)	0.627 (0.533)
Latvia	10.162*** (1.231)	10.021*** (1.235)	10.364*** (1.231)	10.160*** (1.229)	10.298*** (1.233)	10.072*** (1.233)	9.874*** (1.246)	10.546*** (1.234)	9.745*** (1.233)	9.819*** (1.248)
Montenegro	1.281** (0.533)	1.280** (0.532)	0.914* (0.534)	1.006* (0.540)	1.455*** (0.537)	1.180** (0.534)	1.272** (0.537)	1.532*** (0.537)	0.938* (0.536)	0.984* (0.539)
Netherlands	3.645*** (0.639)	3.668*** (0.635)	3.703*** (0.634)	3.759*** (0.639)	3.953*** (0.641)	3.621*** (0.639)	4.390*** (0.641)	3.977*** (0.642)	3.504*** (0.634)	3.913*** (0.628)
Norway	-11.126*** (0.671)	-11.015*** (0.669)	-11.717*** (0.671)	-11.198*** (0.668)	-10.864*** (0.668)	-11.173*** (0.669)	-10.557*** (0.667)	-10.847*** (0.670)	-11.033*** (0.665)	-10.832*** (0.657)
Poland	5.148*** (0.633)	4.983*** (0.634)	4.607*** (0.632)	4.634*** (0.652)	4.962*** (0.637)	4.965*** (0.635)	4.689*** (0.631)	5.236*** (0.631)	4.612*** (0.631)	5.141*** (0.628)
Portugal	-0.556 (0.656)	-0.489 (0.651)	-0.134 (0.655)	-0.431 (0.655)	-0.005 (0.660)	-0.501 (0.657)	-0.152 (0.656)	-0.366 (0.656)	-0.830 (0.654)	-0.225 (0.646)

Serbia	-22.416*** (0.996)	-22.436*** (0.994)	-22.762*** (1.000)	-22.811*** (1.003)	-22.141*** (0.998)	-22.651*** (0.998)	-22.948*** (0.998)	-22.421*** (0.999)	-23.038*** (1.002)	-22.191*** (0.995)
Sweden	-4.837*** (0.738)	-4.651*** (0.731)	-4.800*** (0.728)	-4.734*** (0.733)	-4.556*** (0.731)	-4.829*** (0.732)	-3.957*** (0.743)	-4.599*** (0.735)	-5.096*** (0.726)	-3.768*** (0.721)
Slovenia	2.846*** (0.853)	2.606*** (0.852)	2.747*** (0.847)	2.749*** (0.850)	3.187*** (0.854)	2.729*** (0.851)	2.793*** (0.851)	2.957*** (0.853)	2.209*** (0.850)	2.749*** (0.850)
Slovakia	8.028*** (0.861)	7.657*** (0.859)	7.833*** (0.865)	7.845*** (0.862)	7.682*** (0.849)	7.934*** (0.866)	7.669*** (0.871)	8.252*** (0.867)	7.777*** (0.881)	7.223*** (0.867)
Constant	-2.722*** (0.535)	-2.763*** (0.530)	-2.689*** (0.529)	-2.588*** (0.533)	-2.975*** (0.537)	-2.646*** (0.534)	-2.597*** (0.528)	-2.843*** (0.535)	-2.369*** (0.531)	-3.146*** (0.527)
<i>N</i>	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764	25764
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.248	0.249	0.252	0.249	0.251	0.257	0.250	0.250	0.253	0.268

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.050$, *** $p < 0.01$. The reference category for place of living is “country village / a farm or home in the countryside”. The reference category for the countries is Austria. All basic human values, age, political interest, education, satisfaction with income are standardized. The left right positioning of the elected party is operationalised in such a way that a negative value means a left political attitude and a positive value means a right political attitude.

Source: ESS 2018, own calculations.

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